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A Reno, Nevada physician and member of the National Federation of
Catholic Physicians' Guilds, Dr. Barnet has previously contributed
articles to Linacre Quarterly.
Plato was the teacher of Aristotle, as well as an important source for the
early Christian thinkers including Augustine. Thomas Aquinas continued
to draw on the wisdom of Plato as well as Aristotle. Perhaps by trying to
understand how Plato might have dealt with a modern moral problem, we
might gain that perspective which often comes with standing back and
looking through the eyes of someone less closely involved. O'Rourke and
Brodeur identify as a "serious problem in medical ethics" that "health care
professionals often must decide when to allow a person to die."· Let us try
to examine this question through the gaze of Plato. 2
On Monday, Oct. 6,1986, there was an article on the editorial page of
the New York Times by Alvin Feinstein, Professor of Medicine at the Yale
University School of Medicine, about a 96-year old woman. She was
treated for pneumonia following a stroke and survived. Feinstein describes
her, at that time, as in "the agony of her vegetation". He identifies the
decision to treat her vigorously, which was made by the doctors, as one
which would "benefit no one except their own satisfaction in thwarting
death, regardless of the consequences". As Feinstein ends, he asks,
"Why?", and weeps both for the woman, his mother, and the profession,
also his own.
Plato, and Feinstein, I suspect, would have made one identical decision.
Neither would have treated her pneumonia. I also suspect Feinstein would
have performed one further act, however. He would have held her handnot as physician, but as loving son. The reasons that neither Feinstein nor
Plato would not have treated her would also probably - at least in part
-be different. Feinstein, in his article, seems to base his agony about the
treatment on compassion as well as autonomy and a recognition ofIimits.
He writes of his mother's values and her clearly expressed wishes. She had
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led a full life, was ready to die, and acknowledged that "her time had
come". In her earlier 90s, she had found joy in life. She later recognized she
was becoming a burden and did not want to be one. Yet she did not ask for
the hemlock, but only that death not be thwarted.
Although both Plato, and apparently Feinstein's mother, saw meaning
to life after death, that does not seem to have been a factor in her decision.
Nor was it for Plato in the Republic. when he dealt with similar issues.
What is different for Plato is that he approached the issue in the setting of a
discussion of the community and justice. Mrs. Feinstein was concerned
about being a burden. That was her concern, and not one reflecting her
family's concern or society'S. The medical decision appears to have been
one made without a consideration of whether it would involve a burden for
her, for her family, or for society. The treatment decision presumably was
made because a potentially treatable illness developed . She was in a health
care setting and the system reacted as its structure and goals dictated.

Plato Dealt with Expended Effort

In Book III of the Republic. Plato deals with the question of how much
effort should be expended in the care ofthe ill. He tells of Herodicus* (406
BC) who "became sickly" and "drew out his death .. . attending the mortal
disease he was unable to cure ... and spent his whole life treating it with no
leisure for anything else .. ." then " .. . finding it hard to die, thanks to his
wisdom, he came to an old age."3 Herodicus was a wise man who was able
do cure himself, and presumably did not take anything from other citizens
or from the city. Socrates seems to first belittle and then reject the work of
Herodicus, rather than admire his accomplishments. He states: "He first
and foremost worried himself to death" (even though he lived to be an old
age!) "then many others afterwards". Calling Herodicus "wise" was surely
ironic on Socrates's part.
Socrates commends Asclepius (406 C) for not recommending
Herodicus's regimen, not "from ignorance or inexperience", but "rather
because he knew that for all men obedient to good laws a certain job has
been assigned to each in the city at which he is compelled to work, and no
one has the leisure to be sick throughout life and treat himself." Making
clear the distinction between craftsmen and the rulers, he adds: "It's
laughable that we recognize this for the craftsmen, while for the rich and
reputed happy we don't". Plato recognizes that the role of a profession is
more than to simply exercise the skills of its craft, but that it has an
obligation to bring about good in society. The healing profession has a
mandate which is properly directed at healing although it may not include
the medicalization of dying.

*Herodicus of Selymbria, probably the teacher of Hippocrates, and an advocate of
therapeutic gymnastics.
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Socrates continues (406 DE) with his discussion of the role of the
craftsman, the ordinary man. Since the carpenter is a different man than
Herodicus and has an obvious function in the city, "if someone prescribes a
lengthy regimen for him ... he soon says that he has no leisure to be sick
nor is a life thus spent ... of any profit." " ... He says goodbye to such a
doctor .... If his body is inadequate to bearing up under it he dies and is
rid of his troubles." The ordinary man must, of necessity, be realistic. He is
also autonomous. Herodicus, rather than being required to contribute
can, because of his wealth, perhaps live to a ripe old age. In the city of the
Republic, the carpenter does have a definite and necessary job, and if his
illness (or its therapy) prevents him from fulfilling his function, there "is no
profit to go on living". Medical intervention for Socrates is appropriate
only if it allows the citizen to continue to function in his specific role. This
argument centers on the good of the whole community. If such care did not
deprive others of basic health (i.e., did not disrupt the order) perhaps this
would be less onerous.

Socrates Challenged
Glaucon (407 A) challenges Socrates on his criteria for the use of
medicine. Socrates counters that the rich man, although he may not have a
craft to perform, must, however, practice virtue. "Excessive care" is
burdensome and interdicted for the rich man as well as the craftsman. The
justification is that it disrupts the order and is not virtuous. Overemphasis
on the satisfaction of the body's demands can become an end in itself,
ignoring the soul and man's ultimate goal. There is a danger of
subordinating all (as Herodicus did) to staying alive when there is nothing
to live for but life. The role of medicine in Plato's society is to help man to
avoid extremes. And so Socrates chooses the medicine of Asclepius, not of
Herodicus (407 D):
Then won't we say that Asclepius, too, knew this and revealed an art of medicine
for those whose bodies are by nature and regimen in a healthy condition but have
some distinct and definite disease in them? His medicine is for these men and this
condition; with drugs and cutting to drive out the diseases, he prescribed their
customary regimen so as not to harm the city's affairs. But with bodies diseased
through and through, he made no attempt by regimen - drawing off a bit at one
time, pouring in a bit at another - to make a lengthy and bad life for a human
being and have him produce offspring likely to be such as he; he didn't think he
should care for the man who's not able to live in his established round, on the
grounds that he's of no profit to himself or to the city.

The common good - ofthe city, not just of the citizens - is a guide. For
the craftsman, the guide has been his function as a craftsman; for the rich
man, the guide is also his function in society, which involves being
virtuous. Even for the rich man, there is a limit, as noted in the fate of
Asclepius who ignored his own limit of simple and good medicine (407E408C):
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"You speak," he said, "of a statesman-like Asclepius."
"Plainly," I said. "And don't you see that his sons, because he was like that ,
both showed themselves to be good men in the war at Troy and made use of the
art of medicine in the way I say? Or don't you remember that as well from the
wound Pandarus inflicted on Menelaus.
They sucked out the blood and sprinkled gentle drugs on it and that after this
they didn't prescribe what he must drink or eat any more than with Eurypylus,
believing the drugs to be sufficient to cure men who before their wounds were
healthy and orderly in their regimen, even if they should happen to take a drink
mixed with barley, cheese, and wine right away? And , as for those with a naturally
sickly and licentious body, they thought that living is of no profit either to
themselves or others, that the art shouldn't be applied to them, and that they
mustn't be treated - not even if they were richer than Midas."
"You speak," he said, "of quite subtle sons of Asclepius."
"It's appropriate," I said . "and yet it's injust this that the tragic poets as well as
Pindar don't obey us. Although they claim Asclepius was the son of Apollo, they
also say he was persuaded by gold to cure a rich man who was as good as dead and
it's for this that he was struck with a thunderbolt."

How would Plato deal with the issues raised in the Feinstein essay?
Presumably he would examine the actions (of the physicians) to see what
good they were ordered to, and whether they were virtuous.
Were the actions ordered to the good of the "polis"? Nothing suggests
that . Perhaps they were preserving the "sanctity of life", claiming that each
life must be preserved at all costs. Feinstein's following description of his
mother renders my discussion of "good", either for the patient or the
community, moot:
She recovered , left the hospital and now resides in a nursing home. She can still
recognize her family visitors, say their names, and engage in trivial conversation,
but her mind is substantially destroyed. She does not know where she is or how
long she has been there. She cannot read, watch television, walk alone, use a
telephone or play card games. She retains bladder and bowel continence, but she
cannot dress herself, feed herself or transfer from bed to chair to bathroom.
She is no longer aware of her plight, and expresses no suggestion of despair, but
everything she wanted to avoid has happened. In a semi-vegetating state, she has
lost her functional and mental independence.

Was the action for "the good of the profession"? Feinstein's appraisal is
that it was done "for their own satisfaction". A harsh judgment perhaps. It
cannot be characterized as moderation. It certainly does not fit Plato's
criterion for justice. Plato's reaction would have been, without a doubt, to
call on the gods to send down a thunderbolt. Or so it seems.
One Not Left to Rest
Although Plato was left to rest, Feinstein was not. On Oct. 21 , 1986,
three letters were published in the New York Times. Two were from
physicians. The first charges him with a "misconceived", "simplistic
accusation of the medical profession". For the writer argues that "life and
death" decisions are "rarely easy or clear cut", and seemingly, that when
benefit (any benefit?) is in doubt, and there is any degree of uncertainty
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("when the odds against recovery can no longer be beaten"), therapeutic
action is mandated.
This position is justified by the "awareness that a life lost cannot be
restored", and the "insecurity of placing a value on another's existence".
Feinstein is chided that he should. not "play dice" with his patients' lives.
This first writer has made Feinstein his mother's physician, not his
mother's son. Feinstein's plea was first that his mother's person and her
wishes be respected . Secondly, he was asking that the benefits to her of the
medical decision be considered and weighed. She or her representative had
that right; the physicians had a clear duty both to learn her wishes and to
include them in the decision-making process. Accompanying Feinstein's
essay was a drawing of an elderly gowned woman in a long dark tunnel
(Plato's cave?). This drawing, like Feinstein's essay, has a Rorschach
quality about it. Both are open to variable interpretations which will be
influenced by the perspective of the reader or the observer. My goal is to
explore the role of medicine and I therefore attribute to Feinstein the
concerns of a loving son for his mother and of a physician for his
profession.
A third consideration is what role medicine should play in a life of such a
person as this woman. Is there a time when medicine no longer has a role
(as Plato suggests in the Republic) and should acknowledge that it no
longer functions as a "healer"? Should it recognize that there is a time for
"care-giving" and that "care-giving is different from 'healing' "? It seems
implicit that Feinstein was asking for such a recognition and the right to be
a compassionate "hand holding" son, not a professional decision maker.
Claims of Second Letter

A second letter, also from a physician, calls Feinstein's 96-year old
mother "abnormal" because of her wish to die. He further describes her as
being "under the illusion" of her fierce independence. For his part, this
physician saw "nothing in the record" which should have "induced the
doctor to let her die". He argues that even though the quality of life "may
reach a low point", that it is "nevertheless ... preferable to the alternative."
The argument continues that she has an "eternal ... interdependence"
(mortal or immortal?). She is then labeled as having a "psychosocial
problem". She must, he suggests, acknowledge her dependence and
recognize that she is a victim, not of society or the health care system, but
of "an abnormal fiercely independent outlook". With this she has acquired
a diagnostic label and is coopted by the profession. My own reading is that
she was ready to die as we must all be at some time. The real denial is the
denial of man's mortality. Perhaps the real fiction is that medicine and the
health care system (the medical-industrial complex) should define and
control all aspects of life from birth to death, from nutrition to sports.
Criticism of Feinstein is not surprising. Society and the medical
profession's tendency today is to "roll the dice to win no matter what the
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odds". This is true whether the gamble is for a ten million dollar lottery or a
life and suggests that:
When you are exhausted from trying to beat the odds against recovery, when
you want only to cash in your chips and let them fall where they may, you do not
ask your doctor to gamble with your life but to stop gambling. The physician who
overrules the request, insisting instead on rolling the medical dice again and again
in an effort to see how long the inevitable can be postponed, is the one who is
gambling.
Some doctors, in the midst of such a crapshoot, will actually try to engage the
patient in a debate about the value of human life.'

We had initially looked at Plato's ideas and tried to apply them to the
issues raised by Feinstein's essay. Plato makes frequent use of medical
analogies to help us understand such issues as justice and the role of the
state. These same analogies give us understanding of Plato's ideas .on
medicine. The role of and limits on the state developed in the analogies can
help us reflect on the role of and possible limits on medicine in Plato's
thoughts.
In our initial comments on Feinstein's essay, considered in the context
of Plato's philosophy, we had written of justice and moderation as
appropriate and pertinent themes in The Republic. An admonition for
moderation and a requirement that medicine's role be one ordered to the
good of the state were identified . Although it might be allowed for the rich
to spend their excess wealth for special care, it also might be seen as
burdensome if it "disrupts the order". The replies to Feinstein's essays have
suggested that our goal as physician-citizen should not be the good of the
city, nor even the benefits as individuals see them, but rather the life ofthe
individual for its own sake (or perhaps the "benefit" as the physician sees
it). In The Republic, we were told that the proper role of medicine was to
allow the citizen to continue his work and to fulfill his role in society. How
else does Plato deal with this aspect?
Where Discussion Leads
In The Republic (406-407), Plato's discussion leads to a position that
medicine (as other professions) has a role in society which should be
ordered to the needs of society. When that role is no longer fulfilled, the
physician should cease efforts that are futile . It is, however, quite a
different argument that when one's efforts are futile and no longer
contribute to the common good, that the medical role should be expanded.
That expansion might include the sustenance of a weakened, ill and
incurable citizen or the "merciful dispatch" of the useless. Both are quite
different from the role of nourishing, healing or guidance in developing a
strong and healthy body that prevails in Plato's description of what is
appropriate.
Plato does not argue for the right (or duty) of a physician (406 C) to
determine when to continue to treat, but rather puts that control in the
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hands of the patient. The citizen (such as Feinstein's mother) finding no
prompt and sure cure, goes about "minding his own business; ifhis body is
inadequate to bearing up under it, he dies and is rid of his troubles."
O'Rourke and Brodeur had initially framed the dilemma as one in which
"health care professionals" must be the ones to decide. Is that central to
our problem? Who is to decide? And is not the appropriate medical
decision one of when to treat rather than when to let die? We may be
accused of avoiding the issue, but it is clear that we are not obliged to treat
under all circumstances. The question should be then: under what
circumstances? What Plato has shown us is that not decisions of life and
death, not all aspects of life are medical decisions .
Not only is moderation central to a profession's proper function within
the state, but in The Laws (631 BC)5 we find the same theme applied in a
way which makes it appropriate both for the citizen and state . .The
Athenian stranger ranks goods which are in part human and part divine.
The human goods are subsidiary and "depend on the divine goods". Ofthe
divine goods, "prudence is first and leader among the divine goods. Second
after intelligence comes a moderate disposition of the soul, and from these
two mixed with courage comes justice, in third place. Courage is fourth.
All of these last goods are placed prior in rank to the first", (i.e., prior to the
human goods). "And this is the rank they should be placed by the
legislator." Of the human goods, "health leads the lesser goods; in the
second place is beauty; third is strength, both in running and in all motions
of the body; and fourth is wealth."
Call for a Moderate Stance
Elsewhere in The Laws, the call is for a moderate stance: "What is just
... does not grow apart from moderation" (696 c). In 697 b Plato
recognizes the "limits of human power" as when "it must necessarily
apportion honors and dishonors correctly. The correct apportionment is
one which honors most the good things pertaining to the soul (providing it
has moderation), and secondly, "the beautiful and good things pertaining
to the body". To go outside this ranking is "neither pious or
statesman-like".
A further nuance on the idea that medicine should recognize its limits is
found in the Laws in the discussion of the physician and pilot (of a ship)
being challenged by the unexpected and uncontrollable (709). During
epidemics and storms at sea, it is important to recognize the element of
chance and uncertainty. Plato here invokes art (not science) as a "great
advantage when it comes to operating with the opportune moment in the
midst of a gale". One who possesses the art would "presumably be able to
pray in the correct way for that which, being available to him through
chance, would make nothing lacking except the art" (709 d). Plato, in the
natural order, seems to emphasize the limits of man (pilot and physician)
and call for a recognition that neither change nor divine providence is
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man's domain. We are not gods.
Inherent in Plato's dialogues is a recogmtlOn of the physician's
nurturing role - a role of restoring health. There is recognition that there
is a point in time at which it is not possible nor reasonable to "nurture".
When that role can no longer be fulfilled, such a limitation should be
acknowledged. Plato recognizes our finite capacity which is not the same
as deciding for death. For Plato, the decision for death is not a
consideration of the profession. In The Statesman, physicians are called
on to "nurture" (268) and are to "supervise by art, and, by purging or
slimming (us) ... increasing (us), if only for the good of the bodies, by
making them better from worse." Not only are there limits to what a
physician can do as physician, but there is a time at which it is appropriate
that the physician should recognize that he is no longer "healer and
nurturer". In the context of Plato's ideas, that time would appear to be
when the physician can no longer be effective in sustaining or restoring
citizens to that "role in society which contributes to the common good".
What then may be another's duty is a separate question.
In the care of the aged and the incurable, Plato recognizes an approach
for the physician based on moderation. This involves a recognition of
limits and that the profession's role should be to nourish and heal the sick
and to strengthen the healthy body.
When young children talk about their imaginary friends and
nonexistent exploits, we exclaim, "What a wonderful creative mind!"
When old folks do the same, we classify them as senile and out of touch
with reality. There is an important point that we should recognize about
the elderly who are near the end of their life. Their imagination still
functions. Despite their solitude, they often live a rich interior life - rich in
memories. They have much to remember and are able to imagine and
recreate, frequently changing reality into the more pleasant and
acceptable.
What is needed is both a re-examination of the role of the profession in
providing for the care ofthe elderly, as suggested in our reading of Plato, at
the same time, that we reexamine the role of friends, families and
individuals in society in the humane care of each individual. The need is to
de-medicalize and to de-institutionalize - to humanize those final days.
I do not suggest that the elderly be abandoned. On the contrary, I
suggest that they be rescued from abandonment.
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